LANDLORD AND TENANT-ABATEMENT OF RENT ALLOWED FOR
BREACH OF THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY IN A PATENT
DEFECT

SITUATION--Samuelson v. Quinones, 119 N.J. Super. 338,

291 A.2d 580 (App. Div. 1972).
Valerie Quinones and her family of six were the occupants of a
four-room basement apartment in Newark, New Jersey, at the time
Hannah Samuelson, the landlord-owner, instituted summary dispossess
proceedings against her.' Mrs. Quinones had initially accepted the
apartment "as is," knowing that the apartment contained no heating
fixtures and that the sole source of heat was a gas range. The lease
required initial payments of $90 per month, which were subsequently
raised to $100 and then $110 per month. After two and one-half years
of occupancy, Mrs. Quinones refused to pay rent for two months, fall2
ing $220 in arrears.
At the dispossess proceedings Mrs. Quinones sought a total abatement of rent, alleging the existence of uninhabitable conditions in the
apartment, including numerous defects, disrepairs, and the lack of
heating facilities.3 The defendant asserted that she began withholding
rental payments in order to pay for the repairs necessary to make the
premises habitable. Moreover, she alleged that rent had been withheld
only after the plaintiff had ignored her repeated complaints and requests to repair the defective conditions. 4 The rent withheld was deposited into court pending disposition of the case. 5
The trial court allowed a rent abatement of $30 per month for
1 Samuelson v. Quinones, 119 N.J. Super. 338, 339, 291 A.2d 580, 581 (App. Div. 1972).
Proceedings were held pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-53 (Supp. 1972-73), which provides in pertinent part:
Any lessee or tenant at will or at sufferance, or for a part of a year or for 1
or more years, of any houses, buildings, land or tenements, and the assigns,
undertenants or legal representatives of such tenant or lessee, may be removed
from such premises by the county district court of the county within which such
premises are situated, in an action in the following cases:

b. Where such person shall hold over after a default in the payment of rent,
pursuant to the agreement under which the premises are held,
2 119 N.J. Super. at 339, 291 A.2d at 581. The parties were operating under an oral
lease which created a tenancy from month-to-month at a fixed rental. There were apparently no express covenants. Brief for Appellant at 8.
8 119 N.J. Super. at 340, 291 A.2d at 581. Among the uninhabitable conditions were
a defective gas range, an unsafe kitchen sink, pipe leakage, cracked walls, cracked and
chipped plaster, a defective bathroom door, and a broken window.
4 Brief for Appellant at 3.
5 119 N.J. Super at 338, 291 A.2d at 580. The money was held by the court in escrow.
This procedure is to be distinguished from that outlined by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-55
(1952) by which payment into court terminates the action on jurisdictional grounds.
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two months due to a variety of defective conditions which developed
subsequent to the formation of the lease agreement. However, the
trial court refused to allow an abatement for the lack of heating facilities, concluding that an abatement would not be proper where the
condition was either known to, or observable by, the tenant at the inception of the lease, notwithstanding that the condition was in violation of a municipal housing ordinance. 6 The municipal housing
ordinance, in establishing minimum housing standards, specifically required heating facilities for each and every dwelling unit occupied7
On appeal, Mrs. Quinones sought a total rent abatement, contending that the lease should be deemed void, illegal, and unenforceable ab initio since the condition of the leased premises violated the
municipal housing ordinance. Specifically, she alleged:
(1) that rental of the premises in violation of the municipal housing code constituted a violation of the covenant of habitability,
the housing code constituting the standard by which to measure
habitability; (2) that rental of the premises in violation of the
housing code was an illegal contract unenforceable by the courts;
and (3) that enforcement of the contract where there was a violation of the housing code would be against the State's public policy
of protection of urban low-income tenants.8
The Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey
reversed the decision of the trial court and held that the landlord's
failure to provide adequate heating facilities, in violation of the municipal housing ordinance, breached the implied warranty of habitability. The tenant was thereby entitled to a partial abatement of rent,
notwithstanding her awareness of the defective condition at the in6 119 N.J. Super. at 340, 291 A.2d at 581. Another New Jersey trial court, in a decision
rendered just prior to Quinones, held that violations of municipal ordinances do not go
to the issue of habitability. Mull v. Hamilton, No. T-257818 (Essex County Dist. Ct., Apr.
28, 1971). The facts in Mull are similar to those in Quinones except that the tenant lacked
bath and shower facilities instead of heat.
Abatement in Quinones was limited to the two months of arrearage prior to the time
of trial because N.J.R. 6:3-4 prohibits the joinder of a summary action for possession
with any other claim, counterclaim or third-party complaint. Permitting an abatement
in futuro would create, in effect, a prohibited counterclaim. The tenant must file a separate action to obtain this expanded relief. Academy Spires, Inc. v. Jones, 108 N.J. Super.
395, 402, 261 A.2d 413, 416 (L Div. 1970).
7 NEWARK, N.J. REV. ORDINANcES art. 2, § 15:4-10 (1967) provides in part:
All habitable rooms, bathrooms and water closet compartments shall be
heated by central heating or, in lieu thereof, by a system vented by flue stacks
to accommodate permanent heating fixtures or apparatus, except where heating
is by electrical energy, in which case no flue stacks shall be required.
8 119 N.J. Super. at 340, 291 A.2d at 581.
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ception of the lease and the acceptance of the apartment "as is." 9 In
remanding the case to the trial court, the appellate division directed

that the rent be determined according to the reasonable value of the
demised premises with its lack of heating facilities. 10

The implied warranty of habitability, upon which the Quinones
decision was based, developed from principles of warranty relative to
contract law. 1 A warranty, at common law, is a promise that a certain fact or condition exists or will exist as stipulated, thus relieving
the warrantee from ascertaining the fact for himself. 12 Primarily for
the warrantee's benefit and protection, it provides security that in the

event the fact or condition proves untrue, any loss suffered will be in-

8
demnified by the warrantor.'

Warranties may be either express or implied. When a landlord
9 Id. at 342-43, 291 A.2d at 583.
10 Id. at 343, 291 A.2d at 583.
11 See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074-77 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Note, Implied Warranty of Habitability in Housing Leases,
21 DRAKE L. REV. 300, 306 (1972). Many recent decisions concerning the landlord-tenant
relationship discuss the degree to which the law of contracts should govern the leasehold.
Historically, leaseholds have been regulated solely by the law of real property. Lesar,
Landlord and Tenant Reform, 35 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 1279, 1279-82 (1960), and cases cited
therein.
Initially, the lease was a conveyance of an interest in land. As the emphasis in renting
shifted from the land to dwellings on the land, tenants began to demand that their leases
contain covenants to repair the demised property. Cf. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp.,
supra at 1076.
Such covenants were independent of the tenant's covenant to pay rent as "the rent
issues out of the land, without reference to the condition of the buildings or structures
upon it." Hart v. Windsor, 152 Eng. Rep. 1114, 1119 (Ex. 1843). Therefore, the tenant
was obliged to pay the rent whether the landlord kept the premises habitable or not.
More recently, however, these covenants have become either independent or dependent
"according to the intention and meaning of the parties and the good sense of the case."
Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 145, 265 A.2d 526, 534 (1970) (quoting from Higgins v.
Whiting, 102 N.J.L. 279, 280, 131 A. 879, 880 (Sup. Ct. 1926)). Thus, in the early exceptional cases where a breach of an implied warranty of habitability was found, the courts
generally construed the covenant to pay rent and the covenant to let a habitable dwelling as mutually dependent. As in any contractual arrangement, a breach of one covenant
permitted the termination of obligation under the other. E.g., Smith v. Marrable, 152 Eng.
Rep. 693 (Ex. 1843); Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892). Modern decisions
finding a breach of an implied warranty of habitability in residential or commercial leaseholds generally recognize this dependency of covenants in lease agreements. They have
permitted contractual remedies on the basis that the intent of the parties was that the
dwelling would remain habitable during the entire existence of the lease. See, e.g., Javins
v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., supra at 1079; Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834,
836 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968); Marini v. Ireland, supra at 144, 265 A.2d at 534; Reste Realty
Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969); Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, Ill N.J.
Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556 (Essex County Dist. Ct. 1970).
12 E.g., Dittman v. Nagel, 43 Wis. 2d 155, 160, 168 N.W.2d 190, 193 (1969).
13 Id.
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expressly warrants a given fact or condition in a contract or lease, he
promises that the stipulated fact or condition will be met;14 whereas,
an implied warranty is imposed by law to compel equitable results
between the parties. 15 Reflective of strong public policy,"6 an implied
warranty is inferred by the nature of the lease or the relative situation
or circumstances of the parties.17 It is an obligation on the part of the
warrantor, regardless of his intent, 8 which the court imposes on the
basis that both parties to the lease or contract know, or should know,
that a certain fact or condition exists although it is not expressly stated
therein.' 9
Among the earliest implied warranties of significance in leases
was the landlord's implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, necessitated
by law to assure the tenant a peaceful occupancy. 20 The covenant was
breached if the landlord, or one acting by and through the landlord,
physically ousted the tenant from the demised premises or deprived
21
him in whole or in part of the use or enjoyment of the leased estate.
'4 Strika v. Netherlands Ministry of Traffic, 185 F.2d 555, 558 (2d Cir. 1950); Mitchell
v. Rudasill, 332 S.W.2d 91, 95 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960); see Hyland v. Parkside Inv. Co., 10
N.J. Misc. 1148, 1149, 162 A. 521 (Sup. Ct. 1932) (a landlord's specific restriction of use
interpreted as an express guaranty of fitness for that purpose).
15 Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 106 Ohio App. 265, 272, 149 N.E.2d 181,
186 (1958); see Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 370, 161 A.2d 69, 76
(1960).
16 See Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969), Marini v. Ireland, 56
N.J. 130, 141-44, 261 A.2d 526, 532-34 (1970); Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444,
452, 251 A.2d 268, 272 (1969); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 404,
161 A.2d 69, 95 (1960); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 595-96, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412-13
(1961).
17 The court in Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 595, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412 (1961),
stated that
[the implied warranty of habitability] is based on an intention inferred from the
fact that under the circumstances the lessee does not have an adequate opportunity to inspect the premises at the time he accepts the lease.
Accord, Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 143, 261 A.2d 526, 533 (1970). CI. Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 404, 161 A.2d 69, 95 (1960).
18 Strika v. Netherlands Ministry of Traffic, 185 F.2d 555, 558 (2d Cir. 1950); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 404, 161 A.2d 69, 95 (1960).
19 Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 143, 261 A.2d 526, 533 (1970) (quoting from William
Berland Realty Co. v. Hahne & Co., 26 N.J. Super. 477, 487, 98 A.2d 124, 129 (Ch. 1953)).
20 The court in Pierce v. Nash, 126 Cal. App. 2d 606, 272 P.2d 938 (1954), defined
the covenant of quiet enjoyment as follows: "[w]hether expressed or implied, this covenant
means that a tenant shall not be wrongfully evicted or disturbed in his possession by the
lessor." Id. at 612, 272 P.2d at 943. Accord, Anderson v. Bloomheart, 101 Kan. 691, 694,
168 P. 900, 902 (1917); Stewart v. Drake, 9 N.J.L. 139, 141 (Sup. Ct. 1827).
21 See Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 458, 251 A.2d 268, 275 (1969); Old
Falls, Inc. v. Johnson, 88 N.J. Super. 441, 450, 212 A.2d 674, 680 (App. Div. 1965); Burnstine v. Margulies, 18 N.J. Super. 259, 268, 87 A.2d 37, 41 (App. Div. 1952); McCurdy v.
Wyckoff, 73 N.J.L. 368, 369, 63 A. 992, 993 (Sup. Ct. 1906).
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The exact origin of the implied warranty of habitability has been
traced to Smith v. Marrable,22 an 1843 English case before the Exchequer of Pleas. There the tenant had agreed to lease a furnished
house for a period of five or six weeks, but vacated the premises after
one week's occupancy upon discovering that it was infested with insects and the landlord's extermination attempts had failed.2 3 In denying the landlord's request for the full payment of rent under the lease,
the court reasoned:
A man who lets a ready-furnished house surely does so under the
implied condition or obligation---call it which you will-that the
24
house is in a fit state to be inhabited.
Instead of extending the holding in Smith to all leaseholds, later
court decisions in England, 25 as well as those in America, 26 limited the
warranty to the facts explicit in the Smith case, i.e., a furnished dwelling leased for a short and definite period of time. In succeeding cases
the courts maintained that an implied warranty of habitability is inferred from the nature of the lease, for both parties know that the
specific intent is the immediate occupancy of habitable premises.
Therefore, an exception to the doctrine of caveat emptor should be
allowed when the lessee is unable to inspect or investigate the premises
27
prior to his occupancy.
Except for a few gradual and minor allowances, 28 no significant
22 152 Eng. Rep. 693 (Ex. 1843). See Skillern, Implied Warranties in Leases: The
Need for Change, 44 DENVER L.J. 387, 391 (1967).
23 152 Eng. Rep. at 693.
24 Id. at 694. The court referred to Collins v. Barrow, 174 Eng. Rep. 38 (Ex. 1831),
and Edwards v. Etherington, 171 Eng. Rep. 1016 (K.B. 1825). In Collins, a tenant who had
expressly agreed to keep a house in good repair was allowed to quit when the premises
became "unwholesome, noisome, and offensive" and when such condition was caused
through no fault of his own and could not have been prevented except at unreasonable
expense. In Edwards, the tenant was permitted to terminate a year-to-year tenancy for
serious conditions which prevented the beneficial use and occupation of the premises.
25 E.g., Hart v. Windsor, 152 Eng. Rep. 1114 (Ex. 1843); Sutton v. Temple, 152 Eng.
Rep. 1108 (Ex. 1843).
26 E.g., Davenport v. Squibb, 320 Mass. 629, 70 N.E.2d 793 (1947). But see Delmeter
v. Foreman, 184 Minn. 428, 239 N.W. 148 (1931). For a detailed analysis see Comment,
Landlord and Tenant-Implied Covenant of Fitness for Use-Lease of Building to be
Constructed, 11 B.U.L. Rxy. 119, 120-21 (1931).
27 See Hacker v. Nitschke, 310 Mass. 754, 39 N.E.2d 644 (1942); Young v. Povich, 121
Me. 141, 116 A. 26 (1922).
28 In Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892), the Smith holding was extended to seasonal leases and in Young v. Povich, 121 Me. 141, 116 A. 26 (1922) to a lease
for eight months. Other cases held that an implied warranty of habitability existed where
the lease agreement was entered into prior to completion of the premises to be let. See,
e.g., Woolford v. Electric Appliances, Inc., 24 Cal. App. 2d 385, 75 P.2d 112 (1938); J.D.
Young Corp. v. McClintic, 26 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930). But see Oliver v. Hartzell,
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change in the law occurred until 1961 when, in the landmark case of
Pines v. Perssion,29 the Wisconsin supreme court extended the implied warranty of habitability to cover premises leased for an extended
period.80 The court, after acknowledging the common-law exceptions,
based its decision upon strong dictates of public policy, imposing increased duties upon the landlord to insure adequate housing.81 These
increased duties, the court stipulated, should be imposed whenever
latent defects caused a furnished dwelling held out for lease to become
uninhabitable.8 2 Although the court took notice of patent defects in
existence at the time of the letting, it did not extend the implied warranty of habitability to protect the tenant from such known condi8 3

tions.

Although New Jersey was among the premier states in the area of
consumer protection, 4 as late as 1968 a New Jersey court refused to
accept the breach of a covenant of habitability as a defense to a suit
170 Ark. 512, 280 S.W. 979 (1926) (if sufficiently close to completion, no warranty). For variations of the two exceptions see Comment, Plotting the Long Overdue Death of Caveat
Emptor in Leased Housing, 6 U. SAN FRANclsco L. Rav. 147, 158-59 (1971).
29 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961). The premises in this case was a house
leased from the defendant-owner by students at the University of Wisconsin. The house
was in disrepair and the students tried but failed to clean it up. The Madison, Wisconsin
building inspector found numerous building code violations including "inadequate electrical wiring, kitchen sink and toilet in disrepair, furnace in disrepair." Id. at 593, 111
N.W.2d at 411.
80 Id. at 594-96, 111 N.W.2d at 412-13. Although this case was limited to a furnished
house, subsequent courts and commentators utilized Pines as a cornerstone in extending
the implied warranty of habitability into various commercial and residential leaseholds.
See, e.g., Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 142, 265 A.2d 526, 532 (1970); Reste Realty Corp.
v. Cooper, 53 N.J. at 444, 454-55, 251 A.2d 268, 273 (1969). See also Note, Landlord and
Tenant: Implied Warranty of Habitability Derived from Contract Principles, 1970 DUKE
L.J. 1040, 1041-42; Note, supra note 11, at 306.
31 14 Wis. 2d at 595-96, 111 N.W.2d at 412-13, where the court stated:
Legislation and administrative rules, such as the safeplace statute, building
codes and health regulations, all impose certain duties on a property owner with
respect to the condition of his premises. Thus, the legislature has made a policy
judgment-that it is socially (and politically) desirable to impose these duties on
property owner-which has rendered the old common law rule obsolete. To
follow the old rule of no implied warranty of habitability in leases would, in
our opinion, be inconsistent with the current legislative policy concerning housing
standards. The need and social desirability of adequate housing for people in
this era of rapid population increases is too important to be rebuffed by that
obnoxious legal cliche, caveat emptor.
32 Id. at 596, 111 N.W.2d at 413. The court held this case to be an exception to the
general rule that there are no warranties that the premises are habitable at the time the
lease commences. The exception is limited to premises where the house is furnished.
Id. at 595, 111 N.W.2d at 412. See Collins v. Hopkins, 2 K.B. 617 (1923).
33 14 Wis. 2d at 596, 111 N.W.2d at 413.
34 E.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960);
Michaels v. Brookchester, Inc., 26 N.J. 379, 140 A.2d 199 (1958).
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for possession for non-payment of rent.3 5 New Jersey's recognition of
the implied warranty surfaced the following year in Reste Realty
Corp. v. Cooper,3 6 where the court held that a latent defect in leased
commercial premises rendered the premises uninhabitable and constituted a breach of the implied warranty of habitability.37 The tenant
was permitted to terminate the lease upon leaving the premises from
which, the court held, she had been "constructively evicted." 3 In
reaching its decision the court recognized the public policy considerations espoused by Pines, as well as the inequality of bargaining power
between landlord and tenant and the need for tenant protection indicated by remedial tenement house and multiple dwelling statutes.3 9
In 1970 the implied warranty of habitability gained a stronger
foothold in New Jersey when a tenant's self-help remedy" was sanctioned in Marini v. Ireland.41 The Marini court recognized the right
of a tenant to apply his rent to repairs needed to preserve habitability:
85 Peters v. Kelly, 98 N.J. Super. 441, 237 A.2d 635 (App. Div. 1968). Although the
tenant alleged numerous defects and disrepairs such as roach infested rooms, "off and on"
heating, poor hot water system, and no locks on doors or lights in the hallway, the court
ruled that "the alleged nonhabitable condition of the leased premises is not a defense to
the landlord's suit for possession based on nonpayment of rent." Id. at 443-44, 237 A.2d
at 636. Nowhere in its opinion did the court mention an implied warranty of habitability. The court, however, recognized the need for tenants to have a means to correct
substandard housing, but stated that the solution rests on "administrative regulation and
inspection by trained personnel at the local level." Id. at 444, 237 A.2d at 636.
86 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969).
87 Id. at 460-61, 251 A.2d at 276-77. Here, the tenant's commercial premises were
rendered uninhabitable because of a continual flooding of the floor due to a latent defect
in an exterior wall through which rainwater seeped. In discussing the tenant's rights the
court stated:
[Ilt is immaterial whether the right is expressed in terms of breach of a covenant
of quiet enjoyment, or material failure of consideration, or material breach of
an implied warranty against latent defects.
Id. at 461, 251 A.2d at 277.
38 Id. at 462, 251 A.2d at 278.
39 Id. at 452, 454, 251 A.2d at 272, 273. The court referred to the New Jersey Hotel
and Multiple Dwelling Law, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 55:13A-1 et seq. (Supp. 1972-73).
40 Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 141, 261 A.2d 526, 531 (1970), where the tenant was
permitted to improve her plight by repairing and deducting the expense from the rent
in lieu of vacating. This remedy is allowed, however, only after a reasonable attempt to
have the landlord make such needed repairs fails. Id. at 146, 261 A.2d at 535.
41 56 N.J. 130, 261 A.2d 526 (1970). The tenant and landlord entered into a one-year
lease for residential premises. The rent was payable in monthly installments of $95.00.
When the toilet cracked and the tenant was unable to reach the landlord, she hired a
plumber to repair the toilet and sent the plaintiff a check for $9.28 and the receipted bill
for $85.72. Plaintiff commenced the action to dispossess the defendant for non-payment
of rent. Id. at 134-35, 261 A.2d at 528.
Marini also increased the availability of the courts to the aggrieved tenant. Prior to
this decision, it was not significantly recognized that a tenant could interpose an equitable
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If ... a landlord fails to make the repairs and replacements
of vital facilities necessary to maintain the premises in a livable
condition for a period of time adequate to accomplish such repair
and replacements, the tenant may cause the same to be done and
42
deduct the cost thereof from future rents.

Two months later in Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown,43 the existence of various latent defects compelled a New Jersey county court to
extend the Marini doctrine by allowing the tenant a diminution of rent
in lieu of making repairs for those conditions clearly in breach of the
implied warranty of habitability.44 The court reasoned that a tenant
financially unable to make repairs should not be forced to seek another
apartment in a time of severe housing shortage, but should be allowed a
45
partial abatement of rent as an equitable remedy.
Unlike the aforementioned cases which recognized an implied

warranty of habitability in latent defect situations, Quinones employed
the theory in a patent defect situation. 46 Historically, the doctrine of

caveat emptor placed upon the tenant the duty to inspect the premises before leasing and to contract for the repair of any patent defects

found. Failure to do so relieved the landlord of liability for all damages or injuries caused by the defect and constituted a waiver by the
47
tenant of his right to all claims arising from the disrepair.
As early as 1872, the Pennsylvania supreme court in Moore v.
defense (breach of implied warranty of habitability) to a summary dispossess action,
although a legal defense (payment or accord and satisfaction) was permitted. See Peters
v. Kelly, 98 N.J. Super. 441, 444, 237 A.2d 635, 636 (App. Div. 1968). But see Vineland
Shopping Center, Inc. v. De Marco, 35 N.J. 459, 469, 173 A.2d 270, 275 (1961). Marini
specifically overruled the Peters holding, thus permitting tenants to plead breach of warranty of habitability without the need to file a separate action to recover for rent paid,
56 N.J. at 140, 265 A.2d at 531.
42 56 N.J. at 146, 265 A.2d at 535.
43 111 N.J. Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556 (Essex County Dist. Ct. 1970).
44 Id. at 484, 488, 268 A.2d at 560, 562.
45 Id. at 480, 268 A.2d at 558. The Supreme Court of New Jersey has not yet addressed
itself to the propriety of allowing an abatement of rent as an alternative remedy. Brief for
the New Jersey Tenants Organization as Amicus Curiae at 5, 10, Berzito v. Gambino, 114
N.J. Super. 124, 274 A.2d 865 (Union County Dist. Ct. 1971), rev'd, 119 N.J. Super. 332, 291
A.2d 577 (App. Div. 1972), cert. granted, 62 N.J. 67, 299 A.2d 65 (1973).
46 119 N.J. Super. at 340-43, 291 A.2d at 581-83.
47 The Quinones court recognized this potential problem area in their consideration
of the proposition that
a tenant who agreed in effect to accept the premises "as is" should not be allowed
to obtain an agreement from the landlord as to the rent to be paid, take possession,
and then require repairs and improvements by the landlord.
119 N.J. Super. at 341, 291 A.2d at 582 (referring to Berzito v. Gambino, 114 N.J. Super.
124, 128-29, 274 A.2d 865, 867-68 (Union County Dist. Ct. 1971), rev'd, 119 N.J. Super. 332,
291 A.2d 577 (App. Div. 1972), cert. granted, 62 N.J. 67, 299 A.2d 65 (1973)). See Note,
Violations of Housing Code as Inhabitability, 42 Miss. L.J. 523, 525 (1971).
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Weber4 held that a lessee's knowledge of a patent defect negates any
implication of a breach of a covenant of quiet enjoyment, as "[t]he
lessee's eyes are his bargain. ' 49 In accord is the Reste court which in
1969 stated that "a tenant's knowing acceptance of a defective leasehold would normally preclude reliance upon any implied warranties." 50
Numerous court decisions regarding patent defects in commercial goods
also hold that no warranty should apply against those defects of which
the lessee or vendee has full knowledge at the time the property is
leased or sold.5 '
Consistent with these precedents Mrs. Quinones, by accepting the
apartment "as is," may have been deemed to have waived her right to
heating facilities and any claim or defense arising from their absence.
However, the appellate court acknowledged her claim stating that "the
violation here involved (lack of heating apparatus) clearly goes to the
52
issue of habitability.P
By employing the implied warranty of habitability in a patent
defect situation, the Quinones decision raises a serious question as to
whether the court has interfered with the rights of parties to freely
contract 5 -a right of such significant importance that it is given protection by the Constitution.54 Generally, parties may agree to waive
contractual rights 55 and the courts have upheld such waivers, knowingly
and voluntarily made, unless a question of public policy is involved. 56
71 Pa. 429, 10 Am. R. 708 (1872).
Id. at 432, 10 Am. R. at 711.
50 53 N.J. at 455, 251 A.2d at 274.
51 The court in Marko v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 24 N.J. Super. 295, 94 A.2d 348
(App. Div. 1953) maintained that "[a]n action for breach of warranty does not arise as to
any defect of which the buyer knows." Id. at 300, 94 A.2d at 350. This provision is also
found in the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CoDE, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-316 (3)(b) (1962)
which provides in part:
[When the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the goods or
the sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused to examine the goods
there is no implied warranty with regard to defects which an examination ought
in the circumstances to have revealed to him ....
52 119 N.J. Super. at 342-43, 291 A.2d at 583.
53 See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 389, 161 A.2d 69, 86 (1960).
54 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10 prohibits a state from passing a "law impairing the
obligation of contracts."
55 Van Dusen Aircraft Supplies, Inc. v. Terminal Constr. Corp., 3 N.J. 321, 326, 70
A.2d 65, 67 (1949); Loria's Garage, Inc. v. Smith, 49 N.J. Super. 242, 248, 139 A.2d 430,
434 (App. Div. 1958). See Best v. Crown Drug Co., 154 F.2d 736, 737 (8th Cir. 1946)
(implied covenant may be waived by an express covenant of a more limited character).
56 Although courts keep in mind that society's interests are best advanced when
persons are not restricted in their freedom to contract, they "do not hesitate to declare
void as against public policy contractual provisions which clearly tend to the injury
48
49

1973]

NOTES

Therefore, it is apparent that the Quinones court determined that in
New Jersey, public policy favors the decision that an implied warranty
of habitability cannot be waived. Although the Quinones court did not
specifically discuss those public policy issues prevalent in other recent
landlord-tenant decisions, it did cite authorities which lend support
57
to the societal protection rationale.
The basis for the strong emphasis on public policy in the area of
habitable dwellings is founded on the knowledge that inherently negative effects of poor housing are not limited to persons suffering "the
daily indignity of living in a slum"5 18 but extend to society in general. 59
of the public in some way." Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 403-04, 161
A.2d 69, 95 (1960).
The need for decent and habitable housing was recognized as a public policy issue
over a half-century ago when Justice Holmes stated in Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156
(1920) that "[hjousing is a necessary of life. All the elements of a public interest justifying
some degree of public control are present." This sentiment was recently enunciated in
State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297, 303, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (1971), by Chief Justice Weintraub:
"Property rights serve human values. They are recognized to that end, and are limited
by it." Accord, Inganamort v. Borough of Fort Lee, 120 N.J. Super. 286, 327, 293 A.2d
720, 742 (L. Div. 1972), aff'd, 62 N.J. 521, 303 A.2d 298 (1973):
One can detect a movement-perhaps erratic, but progressive-towards the
constitutional right to be housed .... It is an affront to the dignity of tenants to
provide indecent housing.
See also Note, New Jersey Municipalities Have the Power to Enact Rent Control Ordinances, 4 SETON HALL L. REV. 360, 376 (1972). Public sentiment for decent housing has
been expressed through laws at national, state and local levels. E.g., the United States
Housing Act of 1949, reaffirmed in 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1441a (1972) provides in part
that a national goal should encompass "'a decent home and a suitable living environment
for every American family.'" Likewise, the New Jersey Hotel and Multiple Dwelling Law,
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 55:13A-1 et seq. (Supp. 1972-73), deemed and declared that remedial
legislation,
necessary for the protection of the health and welfare of the residents of this
State in order to assure the provision therefor of decent, standard and safe units
of dwelling space, shall be liberally construed to effectuate the purposes and intent
thereof.
57 E.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970); Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968); Marini v.
Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251
A.2d 268 (1969); Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 111 N.J. Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556 (Essex
County Dist. Ct. 1970).
58 Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Co., 428 F.2d 1071, 1080 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970).
59 Id. at 1079. In Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 371 (1959), the Court stated:
The need to maintain basic, minimal standards of housing, to prevent the
spread of disease and of that pervasive breakdown in the fiber of a people which
is produced by slums and the absence of the barest essentials of civilized living,
has mounted to a major concern of American government.
See also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954) ("Miserable and disreputable housing
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The Pines opinion, which so aptly expressed this sentiment, has been
quoted in a recent New Jersey court decision:
Permitting landlords to rent "tumbledown" houses is at least a
contributing cause of such problems as urban blight, juvenile delinquency and high property taxes for conscientious landowners. 60
Spearheaded by Reste Realty, Marini and Academy Spires, public policy
considerations continue to afford protection to the tenant by strongly
emphasizing the need for adequate and habitable dwelling units for
all. Aware of the unequal bargaining position between landlords and
tenants which is compounded by a severe housing shortage in Newark
and elsewhere, the state legislature has enforced such a policy by the
enactment of remedial tenement house and multiple dwelling statutes. 6'
Courts, likewise, continue to afford the tenant additional protection
by rigidly scrutinizing lease clauses which limit liability to uphold the
just expectations and intentions of the contracting parties, particularly
where an unequal bargaining position is evident.62 In this regard, courts,
conditions may do more than spread disease and crime and immorality."); Edwards v.
Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Buckner v. Azulai, 251 Cal. App. 2d 1013, 59
Cal. Rptr. 806 (1967); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961). Cf. Brown
v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
A favorable effect is noticed where tenants move from substandard to liveable
dwellings. A study by A. SCHORR, SLUMS AND SOCIAL INSECURITY, at 5 (1964) (citations
omitted), disclosed that:
Even when their parents are not responding at all, children change their feelings
about "the whole of life"-a change particularly noticeable in school .... There
is evidence that children who are rehoused are "considerably more likely to be
promoted at a normal pace .... "
60 Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. at 142, 265 A.2d at 532 (quoting from Pines v. Perssion,
14 Wis. 2d at 596, Ill N.W.2d at 413).
61 E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 55:13A-1 et seq. (Supp. 1972-73). In Michaels v. Brookchester,
Inc., 26 N.J. 379, 386, 140 A.2d 199, 203 (1958), the court stated that the Tenement House
Act is "comprehensive legislation intended to assure safe habitation, and it places responsibility where the Legislature has concluded it belongs." The New Jersey legislature has
expressed concern in this area in its findings supporting the enactment of N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:42-85 (Supp. 1972-73), Actions, Etc., for Maintenance of Safe and Sanitary Housing:
The Legislature finds:
a. Many citizens of the State of New Jersey are required to reside in dwelling
units which fail to meet minimum standards of safety and sanitation;
b. It is essential to the health, safety and general welfare of the people of
the State that owners of substandard dwelling units be encouraged to provide
safe and sanitary housing accommodations for the public to whom such accommodations are offered;
c. It is necessary, in order to insure the improvement of substandard dwelling
units, to authorize the tenants dwelling therein to deposit their rents with a
court appointed administrator until such dwelling units satisfy minimum standards of safety and sanitation.
62 Kuzmiak v. Brookchester, 33 N.J. Super. 575, 585, 111 A.2d 425, 430 (App. Div.
1955); Note, The Significance of Comparative Bargaining Power in the Law of Exculpation, 37 CoLUM. L. Rav. 248, 249 (1937), wherein it was stated:
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on occasion, have gone so far as to construe the lease to require substantial compliance with those duties imposed on the landlord by local
housing codes. 63 The utilization of housing code provisions as the standard by which habitability is measured has been based on the premise
that the housing code expresses the "expectations and intentions of
most people," 64 even where the particular parties did not intend to
incorporate the housing code into the lease. 65
In cases where courts have not interpreted local housing codes to
be a part of the existing lease, they have nonetheless afforded protection to the tenant by recognizing the tenant's inferior bargaining position caused by the shortage of low income housing. These courts have
refused to give effect to exculpatory clauses contained in leases or to
allow those clauses to be construed as a waiver by the beleaguered tenant.66 This practice, familiar in many consumer protection cases, is
followed where the contract is of an adhesive nature.67 New Jersey's
landmark case illustrating such a situation is Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc.,68 where the purchaser of a car was awarded damages for
injuries sustained by his wife, even though the manufacturer and
dealer disclaimed any and all warranties other than that limited to the
replacement of car parts.6 9 The court viewed the manufacturer's and
dealer's contract as a standardized mass contract which allowed the
dominant party to dictate terms to the consumer in need of goods and
services but unable to shop around for more favorable terms " 'either
because the author of the standard contract has a monopoly (natural
The validity of a particular exculpation contract depends on the whole
complex of consideration bearing on the question whether it is socially desirable
to allow escape from liability in the situation under scrutiny. . . .Yet it is interesting to note that exculpation is rarely allowed where the parties are not on
roughly equal bargaining terms.
See Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704 (1931).
63 Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1080-81 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970). Cf. Schiro v. W.E. Gould & Co., 18 Ill. 2d 538, 545, 165 N.E.2d 286,
290 (1960) (breach of contract between builder and buyer when house constructed violated
the Chicago building code).
64 Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1081 n.56 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970).
65 Id. at 1081-82.
66 See 53 N.J. at 451-54, 251 A.2d at 271-73. Cf. Kuzmiak v. Brookchester, 33 N.J.
Super. 575, 585-87, 111 A.2d 425, 430-32 (App. Div. 1955).
67 Standard Oil Co. v. Perkins, 847 F.2d 379, 883 (9th Cir. 1965); Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 388-90, 161 A.2d 69, 86 (1960). The UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CODE, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-302 (1962), prohibits enforcement of unconscionable contracts or clauses.
68 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
69 Id.
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or artificial) or because all competitors use the same clauses.' "70 Reflecting upon public policy considerations which found expression in
statutory law through the imposition of an implied warranty of merchantability on the sale of goods, 71 the court held that an
attempted disclaimer of an implied warranty of merchantability
and of the obligations arising therefrom is so inimical72to the public good as to compel an adjudication of its invalidity.
By equating the two situations one can infer that Mrs. Quinones never
bargained for a leasehold which was to be in a less than habitable con73
dition.
Having determined that Mrs. Quinones did not waive the implied
warranty of habitability concerning a patent defect, the court considered whether a breach of the implied warranty had occurred. 74 In
arriving at its decision, the court established that the failure of a landlord to provide heating facilities in a residential leasehold is a breach
of the warranty substantial enough to impair habitability.
It is interesting to note that the Quinones court could have decided the case differently, albeit favorably for Mrs. Quinones, by ruling
that the lease was void, illegal, and unenforceable from its inception,
since it was in violation of the municipal housing ordinance. 75 Had
the court employed this rationale, Mrs. Quinones would have become
a tenant at will. 76 Such a tenancy would require that she be given a
70 Id. at 389, 161 A.2d at 86 (quoting from Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some
Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629, 632 (1943)).
71 32 N.J. at 404, 161 A.2d at 95. The implied warranty of merchantability has been
codified in New Jersey as N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-314 (1962).
72 32 N.J. at 404, 161 A.2d at 95.
Even though Quinones and Henningsen exemplify basically different areas of the law,
the former governed by laws of property, the latter by contract, it is apropos to compare
the two, for modern courts in applying principles of contract law to leases are striving
to afford the tenant the same level of protection that the law affords other consumers.
See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075-76 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970); Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, Ill N.J. Super. 477, 484-85, 268
A.2d 556, 560-61 (Essex County Dist. Ct. 1970).
73 See 119 N.J. Super. at 343, 291 A.2d at 583. The court in Javins stated:
To the extent, however, that some defects are obvious, the law must take note of
the present housing shortage. Tenants may have no real alternative but to accept
such housing with the expectation that the landlord will make necessary repairs.
Where this is so, caveat emptor must of necessity be rejected.
428 F.2d 1071, 1079 n.42 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
74 119 N.J. Super. at 342-43, 291 A.2d at 583.
75 See id. at 341-42, 291 A.2d at 582. This remedy was applied in Brown v. Southall
Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834, 837 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968).
76 Katz v. Inglis, 109 N.J.L. 54, 55, 160 A. 314-15 (Ct. Err. & App. 1932) (lease void
under the Statute of Frauds). The notice requirement was fixed at three months by N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§

2A:18-56(a) (1952).
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minimum of three months notice prior to commencement of an action
for possession by the landlord, 77 whereas her tenancy under the abatement remedy prescribed by the court does not alter her former status
as a month-to-month tenant. As such, she is entitled to only one month's
notice before the commencement of the landlord's action.78 Considering the difficulty of locating habitable premises at a reasonable rental,
she would have benefited from the court's voiding of the lease.
However, should the landlord decide to exercise his right to have
the tenant removed on proper notice, the tenant, having successfully
defended the first action for possession, may claim the landlord's later
action is retaliatory in nature. 79 If the court is convinced that the landlord's action was brought in reply to the tenant's assertion of her legal
rights, the notice will be rendered void and the action dismissed.80
Furthermore, the landlord is liable for any damages which the tenant
suffers through such a proceeding. 8'
However, the Quinones court recognized that many code violations are directed toward amenities or degrees of habitability, and was
not inclined to open the doors to a total breakdown in the existing
rental framework by voiding the lease:
We take judicial notice of the fact that there is an acute shortage of low-income housing in the City of Newark, and that such
housing which exists is frequently not in full compliance with the
city's housing ordinances and building codes. We must also recognize the hard practicalfacts of life that if landlords, under existing
conditions, were to be deprived of all rents because of noncompliance with such ordinances and building codes there would be
far fewer available low income housing units-landlord[s] would

either abandon their properties, or if they spent the money needed
to comply with the ordinances and codes the amount of rent they
would have to charge would price low income tenants out of the
82
market. The problem seems to be almost insoluable [sic].
Thus, the court's refusal to establish the housing code as a standard
77 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-56(a) (1952).
78 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-53(b) (1952).

79 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-10.10 (Supp. 1972-73). This procedure was followed by
the United States Court of Appeals in Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., 463 F.2d
853 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
80 Silberg v. Libscomb, 117 N.J. Super. 491, 496, 285 A.2d 86, 88 (Union County Dist.
Ct. 1971). Moreover, the court could use its power to stay issuance of a warrant for
possession for six months if the eviction was found not to be retaliatory, but the situation
merited such action. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-10.6 (Supp. 1972-73).
81 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-10.10 (Supp. 1972-73).

82 119 N.J. Super. at 343, 291 A.2d at 583 (emphasis added). But see Ackerman, infra
note 86.
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by which to measure habitability may be viewed as a pragmatic attempt
to avoid an unnecessarily broad holding which, in the name of tenantprotection, would eliminate what little low-income housing was then
in existence.
Quinones' remedy for a breach of the implied warranty was an
equitable abatement of rent-a small remuneration for having to live
in an uninhabitable dwelling and a warning to the landlord that she
will suffer financial loss until the dwelling is made livable. The court's
finding that a claim of breach of the implied warranty of habitability
is not barred by the patent nature of the defect would seem to give
the tenant the remedies previously limited to latent defect situations,
i.e., repair and deduct,83 payment of rent to court appointed escrow
agents to provide a fund from which repairs could be financed,s4 or
constructive eviction. 5 However, in a severe housing shortage situation
or when repairs are quite costly these remedies may be of little value.
Even an abatement of rent may not suffice to fulfill the intentions of
the policy makers, or the needs of the tenant, if it is ineffectual in
causing landlords to improve their premises. 80 For example, the landlord, deprived financially by rent abatements, may be forced to abandon, sell, or enter into bankruptcy proceedings, a result the Quinones
court desired to avoid.8 7 Further, should he choose to repair, increased
costs to landlords will price the low-income tenants out of the housing
market due to rental increases for improved dwellings. The validity
of these suppositions would appear to depend on how costly future
court decisions will be for the landlords and, in turn, whether landlords will have available adequate financial aid.
One solution to the landlord's financial problem, which is also
beneficial to the tenant, is the "mortgage theory."'8 By having the
83 56 N.J. at 146, 265 A.2d at 535.

84 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:42-85 et seq. (Supp. 1972-73).
85 53 N.J. at 462, 251 A.2d at 278.
80 If an abatement has the same effect as a fine imposed for a violation of the
housing code, there is doubt as to its effectiveness in causing landlords to improve
substandard housing conditions. In the District of Columbia "the grave conditions in the
housing market required serious action. Yet official enforcement of the housing code has
been far from uniformly effective.." Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071,
1082 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). See generally Ackerman, Regulating
Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and
Income Distribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971); Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 66 COLUM. L. Ray. 1254 (1966).
87 See 119 N.J. Super. at 343, 291 A.2d at 583.
88 This theory apparently had its roots in Connor v. Great W. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 69
Cal. 2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1968). In that case, the financial institution
loaned money to a tract developer under terms extremely favorable to its pecuniary
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mortgagee declare a moratorium on all payments from the landlord
for a fixed period while allowing interest to accumulate, the mortgagee suffers little financial loss, the landlord is not compelled to give
up his apartment building, and the tenant obtains the needed repairs
by having the total rent paid by all tenants directed to the repair
expense. Resolving the problem in this manner has merit, and the
court, by ordering injunctions to repair, can aid the tenant without
imposing an unbearable burden upon the landlord.
Other solutions for the landlord might include governmental rent
subsidies, supplements and increased tax write-offs. Although this in
turn compels a re-evaluation of governmental spending, the losses
accruing to tenants and society from substandard housing significantly
outweigh the difficulties imposed upon the legislatures in resolving
this problem.
Sarah E. Noddings
advantage and without the precautions normally taken in such a situation, causing damage
to plaintiffs when their houses were subsequently damaged by defects. The court held that
the plaintiffs could recover from the institution for its actions. Id. at 867, 447 P.2d at 618,
73 Cal. Rptr. at 378. A Florida court refused to impose liability on a financial institution
in a case distinguishable on its facts. Rice v. First Fed. S. & L. Ass'n of Lake County, 207
So. 2d 22 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (an inspection made by the institution need not be for
the mortgagor's benefit).
A New Jersey court referred to these decisions in Morocco v. Felton, 112 N.J. Super.
226, 234, 270 A.2d 739, 743 (L. Div. 1970). The court further stated, in dictum, that it
might be necessary to implead a third party depending upon the facts of the situation
and the appropriateness of the relief sought. Id. at 234-36, 279 A.2d at 743-44. The
mortgage theory might well be the next logical step in this progression.

